Poland - Putin’s Unwitting European Ally?

 

The pivotal parliamentary elections in Poland on October 15^th could be a watershed, not just for that country, but for the whole European project. In the first place, however, it is a wake-up call for Poland’s more progressive traditional political and cultural elites who had been in the forefront of the struggle for freedom during Communist rule and have had a strong pro-European pro-Western world picture going back a thousand years, ever since Poland accepted Christianity from Rome, rather than from Byzantium. They face a more authoritarian, nationalist, and Catholic narrative presented by the present government, and force fed to the people by the robust message from a virtual government monopoly on state television, and a bully pulpit in the churches. Will the Polish electorate, and, in particular, its rural and provincial element, stay loyal to the government and shy away from Poland’s earlier Western orientation. The ruling United Right Coalition leadership, headed by the Law and Justice party leader, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, sees the country as consisting of a breed of good Poles, who are nationalistic, family orientated and Catholic, and a breed of “worse” Poles, liberal, atheist, post-Communist, which have to be kept out of power by all means possible. So, any measure that helps the right retain power is good. After all, were they to lose power, many would face charges of corruption or breaching the constitution. That includes a subservient judiciary, retaliatory measures against the remaining independent media, an economic policy based on crude handouts, such as the original 500plus (which initially stimulated the economy and then helped stagnate it), pre-election reductions in state-controlled motorway tolls, petrol prices, train tickets in a period of high 9.5% inflation, higher pension and a constant anti-European, anti-immigrant, ecosceptic buzz in the state media.

Kaczynski is acutely attuned to the prejudices and fears of poorer families which he can play unchallenged, dressing up the resulting campaign in patriotic national colours. He has a rock solid 30% to 35% electoral support which gives him the key to power, while the opposition parties remain disunited with smaller parties in danger of not crossing the minimum threshold to win parliamentary seats.

At the European level, it is the threat of another illiberal Central European government maintaining its hold on power and, in tandem with Hungary, working to challenge and eventually undermine the European Union, over its immigration policy, which increasingly haunts the EU. Poland has made clear that, unlike the British Brexiteers, it does not want to leave the EU, but intends to undermine and change it from within. The current Polish prime minster Morawiecki has talked of his mission to “rechristianize Europe”. This is made worse for the EU because of the relative size of Poland which makes it the fifth largest in the EU in population, and  sixth in the size of its economy. On the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, Poland was seen, and even admired, as Ukraine’s greatest friend in Europe, absorbing more that 1.3 million Ukrainian refugees. It has increased its defence budget dramatically and boasted that it wants to double the size of its army in the next two years. Poland has been in the forefront of the European frontier states pressing on their Western colleagues to ensure military and political support for Ukraine and a promise of EU membership when the war is over.  They have supported the controversial slogan of Ukraine joining NATO, which is such a provocative challenge to the Russian Federation.

This stand reflected the country’s mood and had the support of all the opposition parties with the exception of the extreme right-wing Confederation movement. In fact, the Polish government built no camps to shelter the refugees. They did not need to, as Polish families, Polish institutions, and schools, and churches, offered that hospitality spontaneously. It was only after a few weeks that the government got round to offering benefits to Polish families accepting refugees. Poland was the only country to keep an Ambassador in place in Kyiv from the first day of the invasion. President Duda, normally a political cipher for the United Right government (called the “fountain pen”, as signing dubious government legislation was his regular routine),  was admired in Poland for the political support he offered Ukraine in NATO capitals, for admonishing the German government for its slow response, and for regularly visiting Ukraine.

So why was it that in September Poland was at the forefront of blocking Ukrainian grain exports and then declaring that they were sending no more arms to Ukraine? Why did President Duda accuse his “friend” Zelensky, President of wartime Ukraine of “drowning and clutching at straws”? Why did this elicit joy in Moscow as the Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov gloated over “a split between Poland and Ukraine that will only grow”? Had the Polish government really chosen to reverse its long-established alliance with an independent Ukraine, which had been a constant factor in Poland’s foreign policy since 1991, when Poland and Ukraine first became independent?

The answer was that this was not a reverse in policy, merely another twist and turn in Poland’s turbulent internal struggle to retain power in the pre-election months. To the current Polish government foreign policy is merely an instrument in the government’s battle for survival. In fact, Kaczynski and the initial party leadership did not know any foreign languages and were completely oblivious to public opinion abroad. The only Western leader they could identify with was Donald Trump and they were among the last to recognize the last U.S. election results. They have consistently challenged EU directives and European Court of Justice rulings, and have kept up a negative campaign in their media against opposition leaders who share the EU’s liberal values. They have maintained a consistent negative campaign against Germany, whom they treat with almost the same hostility as Russia, equating the EU’s challenge to Poland’s judicial reforms with Germany’s bid to dominate Europe and subjugate Poland’s sovereignty. They also equate the opposition leaders, and particularly former EU statesman Donald Tusk, with being German agents. In order to embarrass the opposition, they dug deep into Poland’s wartime trauma of German occupation, to present Germany with a £1.2tn bill for war reparations. This negated Poland’s earlier agreed settlement of war claims. The government hoped that the opposition could be manoeuvred into appearing unpatriotic by opposing the claim. (It didn’t.) In doing so it completely ignored the German reaction and its impact on the growing strength of Germany’s right-wing opposition.

This issue with Ukraine had blown up suddenly after a Polish state enterprise foolishly chose to buy in cheap Ukrainian grain being shipped through Poland for third world destinations. Once this grain flooded the markets in Poland, Polish farmers had been sufficiently aggrieved to demand that these cheap grain shipments stop, in order to protect Poland’s native agricultural produce. Initially, the EU, which is responsible for all trade policies in Europe, put on a temporary ban, but after a few weeks the ban was lifted. The Polish government proudly followed its regular game of “patriotically” defying EU rulings and continued the ban along with Hungary and Slovakia. When Ukraine complained and threatened to appeal to the World Trade Organization, Poland retaliated with a torrent of verbal accusations of Ukrainian ingratitude, a statement by Morawiecki that Poland will stop providing weapons to Ukraine, and would now “re-arm itself” and not Ukraine, and that benefits to families helping refugees should be withdrawn. The fact that such language from a hitherto firm ally would please Russia, upset Ukrainian morale and split the allied solidarity over Ukraine, was immaterial. The government could on no account lose farmers’ support in the coming election. Nothing else matters.

A further scandal emerged recently within the Polish foreign ministry where hundreds, if not thousands, of Polish visas had been sold illegally in precisely those third world countries, whose immigrants, the Polish border guards were holding back, often with great brutality, on the Belarusian border. Polish visas give immediate access to the EU and also to Mexico, from where refugees pour across the U.S. border. The U.S. is demanding an explanation and Germany is discussing the possibility of imposing immigration controls on the Polish border, possibly undermining the Schengen open border agreement. It adds to the Polish government’s anti-German and anti-European persecution complex reflected in the election campaign.

The Polish government’s sophisticated internal electoral machine is very much in contrast to the spasmodic infantile outbursts of its foreign policy relations. Yet, when viewed dispassionately by foreign policy analysts they can see an agenda of hostility to Germany and Europe, a sympathy for Trump, a right-wing illiberal pro-family social programme, and a slowdown in support for Ukraine, which is common both to Polish and Russian current policy. Certainly, western countries are holding their breath over the coming election results, in the pious undeclared hope that the disunited opposition parties can avoid fratricidal conflicts and topple the United Right’s  majority in parliament and bring back sanity to Poland’s future foreign policy.

Wiktor Moszczynski                                        01.10.2023